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CONFIRMING JUDGES IN THE 2016 SENATE LAME 
DUCK SESSION 
Carl Tobias∗ 
In this piece, Professor Carl Tobias descriptively scrutinizes the nomination and confirmation 
regimes throughout the administration of President Barack Obama.  The article critically 
evaluates selection finding that persistent Republican Senate obstruction resulted in the 
greatest number of unoccupied posts for the longest duration, briefly moderated by the 2013 
detonation of the “nuclear option,” which constricted filibusters.  Nevertheless, the article 
contends when the Grand Old Party (GOP) attained a chamber majority, Republicans 
dramatically slowed the nomination and confirmation processes after January 2015.  
Therefore, openings surpassed ninety before Congress is scheduled to reassemble.  Because 
this dilemma erodes rapid, inexpensive, and equitable disposition, the article suggests how the 
Senate should promptly reduce the multitude of unfilled judgeship once the lame duck session 
commences. 
 
Following the prolonged summer recess and Congress’ truncated ap-
pearance on Capitol Hill, the politicians departed Washington in September 
until November.  The protracted absence of Senators permitted merely one 
judge’s confirmation after June, leaving the bench with ninety-four empty 
seats when members convene in November.  Moreover, presidential and 
Senate election results will provoke numerous circuit and district judges to 
assume senior status or retire, which means that the courts will probably 
face 110 vacancies out of 842 lower court judgeships at the 2017 Inaugura-
tion Day.  Regardless of who captured the presidency and the upper cham-
ber, Democratic and Republican Senators need to cooperate and fill the po-
sitions over the lame duck session.  Tribunals require their entire 
complement of judges for delivering justice, yet presently attempt to re-
solve massive caseloads with ninety-four vacancies.  Appointments in the 
congressional session which begins after the elections merit consideration. 
The piece descriptively scrutinizes the nomination and confirmation re-
gimes throughout the administration of President Barack Obama.  It criti-
cally evaluates selection and finds that persistent Republican Senate ob-
struction resulted in the greatest number of unoccupied posts for the longest 
time, which the 2013 detonation of the “nuclear option” that constricted fil-
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ibusters briefly moderated.  Nevertheless, when the Grand Old Party (GOP) 
attained a chamber majority, Republicans dramatically slowed the nomina-
tion and confirmation processes after January 2015.  Therefore, openings 
surpassed ninety before Congress is scheduled to reassemble.  Because this 
dilemma erodes rapid, inexpensive, and equitable disposition, the paper 
suggests how the Senate should promptly reduce the multitude of unfilled 
judgeships once the lame duck session commences. 
I. OBAMA ADMINISTRATION JUDICIAL SELECTION 
At President Obama’s inauguration, the lower federal courts encoun-
tered fifty-four vacancies.1  The administration swiftly ensured careful 
nomination for able, centrist, diverse prospects.2  The White House con-
sulted home state elected officers and aggressively pursued their recom-
mendations of superb, consensus individuals, especially minority, female 
and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) picks.3  Numerous 
lawmakers concomitantly adopted special initiatives which could detect, 
examine and propose talented, mainstream submissions, notably persons of 
color, women and LGBT selections.4  The White House correspondingly 
assembled ideas from conventional outlets, particularly the American Bar 
Association (ABA), and less customary sources, encompassing minority, 
women’s and LGBT bar groups and politicians familiar with strong candi-
dates.5  They helped aspirants navigate the pre-nomination system while 
tendering multiple fine possibilities.  Officials then sent choices and Obama 
canvassed them, nominating many. 
The Obama White House significantly improved the appointments pro-
cedures,6 comprehensively seeking aid from both parties.7  Obama engaged 
 
 1 Russell Wheeler, Judicial Nomination: Into the Home Stretch, BROOKINGS INST. (2010), 
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/judicial-nomination-into-the-home-stretch/; see VACANCIES 
IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2009). 
 2 Carl Tobias, Judicial Selection in Congress’ Lame Duck Session, 90 IND. L.J. SUPP. 52, 53 
(2015) citing Carl Tobias, Senate Gridlock and Federal Judicial Selection, 88 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 2233, 2239-40 (2013); see also Sheldon Goldman et al., Obama’s Judiciary at Midterm, 94 
JUDICATURE 262 (2011) (explaining that Obama’s nominees were among the most diverse in his-
tory). 
 3 Tobias, supra note 2, at 53, citing 160 CONG. REC. S5364 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2014) (statement of 
Sen. Leahy); Sheldon Goldman et al., Obama’s First Term Judiciary, 97 JUDICATURE 7, 18 
(2013) (emphasizing Obama’s excellent record of nominating “nontraditional” candidates, such 
as women and racial and ethnic minorities); Tobias, supra note 2, at 2239-40. 
 4 Goldman et al., supra note 3, at 7, 18; Carl Tobias, Postpartisan Federal Judicial Selection, 51 
B.C. L. REV. 769, 777 (2010). 
 5 Tobias, supra note 2, at 53.  I also rely in this and in the next two sentences on Goldman et al., 
supra note 3; sources supra note 2. 
 6 Jeffrey Toobin, The Obama Brief, NEW YORKER, Oct. 27, 2014, at 24; see sources supra note 2. 
 7 Tobias, supra note 2, at 2239 (finding that Obama improved the appointments process by assidu-
ously consulting and by emphasizing competence, ethics and diversity, rather than ideology); Pe-
ter Baker & Adam Nagourney, Tight Lid Defined Process in Selecting a New Justice: Using Past 
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Senators Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), the Judiciary Committee Chair, who 
speedily instituted nominee panel hearings and votes; Harry Reid (D-Nev.), 
the Majority Leader, who directly controlled the floor; and Chuck Grassley 
(Iowa) and Mitch McConnell (Ky.), their Republican analogues.8  Despite 
concerted Democratic endeavors, the GOP failed to reciprocate.9  After 
nominations, Leahy swiftly initiated hearings,10 but the minority party held 
over ballots seven days without reasons for excellent prospects whom the 
committee unanimously approved the next week.11  McConnell collaborat-
ed little to set final votes, and his colleagues duly placed anonymous holds, 
or those with no substantiation, on capable, moderate nominees; this frus-
trated appointments, mandating cloture.12  Republicans assertively de-
manded plentiful, unwarranted roll call ballots and debate time and this 
wasted scarce floor hours.13  Therefore, by fall 2009, circuits wrestled with 
twenty, and district courts seventy-five, open positions, which effectively 
remained constant over the succeeding half decade, comprising the highest 
rate for an unprecedented period.14  This situation worsened in 2013 when 
Obama picked competent, mainstream, diverse aspirants for three D.C. Cir-
cuit vacancies.15  After the GOP rejected yes or no votes for each, the 
machinations forced Democrats to cautiously invoke the nuclear option.16  
 
Battles to Avert Pitfalls, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2009, at A1 available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/28/us/politics/28select.html (Obama sought both parties’ assis-
tance by consulting with every Judiciary Committee member from each party). 
 8  Senator Grassley replaced Senator Jeff Sessions (Ala.) as Judiciary Committee Ranking Member 
in 2011.  Carl Tobias, Judicial Selection in Congress’ Lame Duck Session, 90 IND. L.J. SUPP. 52, 
53 (2015) citing Tobias, supra note 2, at 2242. 
 9 For instance, some politicians slowly tendered names or recommended none.  Goldman et al., 
supra note 3, at 17; Sheldon Goldman et al., Obama’s First Term Judiciary, 97 JUDICATURE 7, 
17 (2013). 
 10 Tobias, supra note 2, at 53; Maureen Groppe, No Sparks Fly at Hearing, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, 
(Apr. 30, 2009), at 3A. 
 11 Sessions found that most candidates whom Obama tapped were “fine nominees.”  Exec. Business 
Mtg., S. Judiciary Comm., 111th Cong. (Oct. 8, 2009); Exec. Business Mtg., S. Judiciary Comm., 
111th Cong. (Oct. 15, 2009). 
 12 155 CONG. REC. S11, 421 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 2009); 156 CONG. REC. S820 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 
2010); Tobias, supra note 2, at 2246 (providing several examples of how filibusters can devour 
scarce resources and prolong vacancies). 
 13 The GOP even sought sixty, and used five, minutes for strong choices like Judge Beverly Martin; 
she won approval 97-0.  156 CONG. REC. S13, S18 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 2010); Doug Kendall, The 
Bench in Purgatory, SLATE, Oct. 26, 2009, http://www.slate.com/art
icles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2009/10/the_bench_in_purgatory.html. 
 14 Archive of Judicial Vacancies (2009-14), supra note 1. 
 15 Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by the President on Nomina-
tions to the D.C. Circuit (June 4, 2013); Michael Shear and Jeremy Peters, Judicial Picks Set 
Stage for Senate Battle, N.Y. TIMES, June 4. 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/us/politics/obamatoname3totopappealscourtinchallengetore
publicans.html. 
 16 I rely substantially in this and the next sentence on 159 CONG. REC. S8, 418 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 
2013); Toobin, supra note 6; Jeremy Peters, Building a Legacy, Obama Reshapes Appellate 
Bench, N.Y. TIMES Sept. 14, 2014, 
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They marshaled fifty-one, not sixty-seven, ballots when amending the fili-
buster rule to require a majority vote for cloture.  Detonating the nuclear 
option essentially allowed Senate majorities to confirm all three D.C. Cir-
cuit possibilities and many other circuit and district court nominees.17  In 
2014, Reid emphasized appellate court candidates, arranging cloture and 
Senate votes most weeks that the chamber operated.18  Those actions, espe-
cially the nuclear mechanism’s release, permitted the courts of appeals to 
confront seven openings, although the districts had thirty-two, when Con-
gress adjourned near 2014’s close.19 
Over 2015, after Republicans had captured a Senate majority,20 already 
negligible coordination further diminished.  GOP leaders incessantly 
pledged they would again bring to the chamber “regular order,” a phase 
employed to describe the approach which Republicans claimed governed 
before Democrats ostensibly eroded it.  Early in January, McConnell, the 
new Majority Leader, urged:  “We need to return to regular order.”21  
Grassley, the new Judiciary Chair, vowed he would treat nominations anal-
ogously.22  Despite many promises, Republicans slowly designated choices 
for Obama to review, planned nominee hearings and committee ballots, and 
scheduled chamber debates and votes.  This meant that, by 2015’s conclu-
 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/14/us/politics/building%ADlegacy%ADobama%ADreshapes
%ADappellate%ADbench.html?_r=1. 
 17 159 CONG. REC. S8584 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2013); id. at S8667 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2013); 160 
CONG. REC. S283 (daily ed. Jan. 13, 2014); Todd Ruger, Court Seats Filling Up: Democrats 
Push Votes Ahead of Elections, NAT’L L. J., Aug. 11, 2014. 
 18 Leahy statement, supra note 3; Burgess Everett, How the Senate reshaped the courts, POLITICO 
(Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/08/how-going-nuclear-unclogged-the-
senate-110238. 
 19 Jeffrey Toobin, Bench Press, NEW YORKER, Sept. 21, 2009, at 42. Appellate court openings were 
at their lowest point since 1990.  This is particularly striking, because 1990 judgeships legislation 
approved 11 new judgeships, bringing the total to 179. Pub. L. No. 101-650, Tit. II, § 206, 104 
Stat. 5098 (1990).  Partisanship that was formerly confined to Justices has now infected all levels 
of the federal judiciary.  Goldman et al., supra note 3, at 12-14; Tobias, supra note 2, at 2234-38. 
 20 Jerry Markon et al., Republicans Win Senate Control as Polls Show Dissatisfaction with Obama, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-control-at-stake-in-
todays-midterm-elections/2014/11/04/e882353e-642c-11e4-bb14-4cfea1e742d5_story.html; Jon-
athan Weisman & Ashley Parker, G.O.P. Takes Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2014, at A1. 
 21 He repeated the mantra throughout last year and all of 2016.  161 CONG. REC. S27-28 (daily ed. 
Jan. 7, 2015); id. at S2767 (daily ed. May 12, 2015); see Sarah Binder, Can Mitch McConnell 
Repair the Senate?, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2014, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/11/12/can-mitch-mcconnell-
repair-the-senate/ (explaining the regular order concept). But see 161 CONG. REC. S2949 (daily 
ed. May 18, 2015) (statement of Sen. Reid) (criticizing the twenty nominations pending in the 
Judiciary Committee, and twenty-five judicial emergencies); 162 CONG. REC. S5433 (daily ed. 
Sept. 8, 2016) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (arguing that Republicans refusal to process Garland 
demonstrates the failure to return to regular order). 
 22 S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (Jan. 21, 2015); David Catanese, Grassley’s Gavel 
Year, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 28, 2015; Carl Tobias, The Republican Senate leader and 
regular order, THE HILL, July 14, 2016, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/287713-
the-republican-senate-leader-and-regular-order. 
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sion, eight of nine appellate vacancies lacking nominees - which the Ad-
ministrative Office of the U.S. Courts identified as emergencies - plagued 
states that GOP members represented.23  One circuit and ten district jurists 
won confirmation last year. 
2016 is a presidential election year when judicial appointments conven-
tionally stall and ultimately halt, complications intensified by GOP refusal 
to process U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Chief 
Judge Merrick Garland, Obama’s accomplished, mainstream High Court 
nominee.24  The Senate approved one circuit and eight trial court jurists be-
fore departing to campaign in late September, yet Republicans averaged 
only a lone confirmation per month since January 2015 and there could be 
110 empty posts on the next Inauguration Day.25 
II. CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
A.  Difficulties 
Striking obstruction and rampant partisanship impose harmful effects.  
Making superb, moderate nominees wait prolonged times leaves robust ca-
reers on hold and dissuades many stellar prospects from contemplating the 
 
 23 For the eight of nine vacancies, see Judicial Vacancies, supra note 1 (2016), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-
vacancies/2016/01/vacancies.  Republican Senators cooperated minimally, which prompted 
Obama to nominate no candidates across 2015.  However, Obama did tap seven nominees in 
2016.  JUDICIAL VACANCIES, supra.  Some prospects lack hearings, because home state Senators 
retain “blue slips.”  E.g., Jonathan Tamari and Jeremy Roebuck, Obama’s Pick for Judgeship 
Her Draws Toomey’s Ire, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 15, 2016; see Ryan Owens et al., Ideology, 
Qualification, and Covert Senate Obstruction of Federal Court Nominations, 2014 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 347 (analyzing blue slips). Emergencies reflect substantial docket size and protracted va-
cancy length.  Toobin, supra note 19. 
 24 Russell Wheeler, The Thurmond Rule and Other Advice and Consent Myths, BROOKINGS INST. 
(May 25, 2016), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2016/05/25/thethurmondruleandotheradviceandconsentm
yths/; Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President Announcing Judge Merrick 
Garland as his Nominee to the Supreme Court (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2016/03/16/remarks-president-announcing-judge-merrick-garland-his-nominee-
supreme; Michael Shear et al., Obama Chooses Merrick Garland for Supreme Court, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 16, 2016, at A1. McConnell has continuously vowed that the next President will fill 
this vacancy.  Ariane de Vogue, How McConnell Won, and Obama Lost, the Merrick Garland 
Fight, CNN.COM (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/09/politics/merrick-garland-
supreme-court/; Manu Raju, No Confirmation for Garland in Lame Duck Session, CNN.COM 
(Sept. 13, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/09/politics/merrick-garland-supreme-
court/index.html. 
 25 JUDICIAL VACANCIES (2015-16), supra note 1; Russell Wheeler, Recess is Over:  Time To Con-
firm Judges, BROOKINGS INST. (Sept.6, 2016), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2016/09/06/recess-is-over-time-to-confirm-judges/. 
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bench.26  This resistance deprives tribunals of necessary judicial resources 
and myriad litigants of civil and criminal justice, while it undermines swift, 
economical and fair case disposition,27 and public regard for the confirma-
tion system and the coequal branches.28 
B.  Benefits 
Notwithstanding these problems, Obama’s impressive work and dili-
gent efforts by lawmakers who cooperated with the White House realized 
considerable success when they approved numbers of very qualified, mod-
erate, diverse candidates at 2014’s close.  For instance, Obama tripled the 
Asian American circuit jurists,29 named the first gay appellate judge,30 ex-
panded the number of female choices’ represented to more than 40 percent 
and increased experiential diversity.31  This White House reduced openings 
to thirty-nine by the end of 2014; however, in November, the bench will 
have thirteen circuit, and eighty-one district, vacancies when Congress re-
convenes for the lame duck session.32 
Assiduous efforts by President Obama and Senators who helped con-
firm a plethora of talented, diverse nominees, yield advantages.  Many cir-
cuit and district courts with fewer openings comparatively quickly, inex-
pensively and equitably resolve immense, complex filings.33  Enlarged 
diversity also improves comprehension and review of essential questions, 
notably involving constitutional and criminal law, and experiential diversi-
ty can supply those and related benefits.34  People of color, women and 
 
 26 157 CONG. REC. S6027 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 2011) (statement of Sen. Leahy); Tobias, supra note 2, 
at 2253. 
 27 JOHN ROBERTS, 2010 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 7-8 (2010); Jennifer 
Bendery, Federal Judges Are Burned Out, Overworked and Wondering Where Congress Is, 
HUFFINGTONPOST (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/judge-federal-courts-
vacancies_us_55d77721e4b0a40aa3aaf14b. 
 28 Tobias, supra note 2, at 2253. 
 29 Federal Judicial Center, History of the Federal Judiciary, Biographical Directory of Judges, 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (2016); This is the First Time Our Judge 
Pool Has Been So Diverse, WHITE HOUSE.GOV (June 8, 2016), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/share/judicial-nominations. 
 30 Todd Ruger, Obama Names Record Number of Gay Judges, NAT’L L. J., (July 21, 2014); Mark 
Joseph Stern, Obama’s Most Enduring Gay Rights Achievement, SLATE, (June 17, 2014); 
Toobin, supra note 6. 
 31 President Obama also appointed two female Justices, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan.  
Toobin, supra note 6; WHITE HOUSE.GOV, supra note 29. 
 32 JUDICIAL VACANCIES, supra note 1 (2016).  Insufficient time remains to fill all thirteen appellate 
court vacancies in 2016. 
 33 When courts have full judicial complements, this relieves overworked judges.  Leahy statement, 
supra note 3; Tobias, supra note 2, at 2254. 
 34 RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES (1995); SALLY KENNEY, GENDER AND JUSTICE 
(2013); FRANK WU, YELLOW (2003).  But see Stephen Choi et al., Judging Women, 8 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 504 (2011)(finding that gender does not affect judicial decision mak-
ing). 
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LGBT individuals could mitigate ethnic, gender and similar biases that im-
pair justice.35  Courts that mirror America enhance public confidence.36 
In short, the advantages of confirming able, consensus, diverse jurists 
eclipse the adverse impacts which can result from politicization and ob-
struction.  Thus, in the lame duck session, both sides need to maximize col-
laboration that will promote the appointment of numerous such choices and 
carefully minimize the detriments which partisanship and obstruction cre-
ate. 
III.  SUGGESTIONS 
Republicans and Democrats should redouble their efforts to confirm the 
largest possible number of trial and circuit judges in the lame duck ses-
sion.37  Approving remarkable, consensus, diverse persons affords multiple 
benefits.  For example, these jurists invariably could help to speedily, eco-
nomically, and fairly resolve courts’ huge dockets and furnish perceptive 
insights on complex fields of litigation. 
The GOP may argue the Senate failed to confirm judges after Presidents 
captured election in 1988, 1992, 2000, and 2008.38  However, more telling 
was Stephen Breyer’s 1980 circuit appointment once Ronald Reagan de-
feated Jimmy Carter, a process eased by Strom Thurmond, who fashioned 
the “rule” providing that approvals can be delayed and stopped in presiden-
tial election years.39  Republicans also should remember that GOP home 
state politicians recommended a majority of the twenty well qualified, 
mainstream district nominees whom the Judiciary Committee approved by 
voice vote without dissent.40  Republicans as well should keep in mind the 
substantial waste entailed in failing to consider these nominees, the huge 
amount of time, money, and energy that the government must expend to 
 
 35 REPORT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT GENDER, RACE AND ETHNIC BIAS TASK FORCES (1999); FINAL 
REPORT, NINTH CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON RACIAL, RELIGIOUS, AND ETHNIC FAIRNESS (1997). 
 36 Sheldon Goldman, A Profile of Carter’s Judicial Nominees, 62 JUDICATURE 246, 253 (1978); 
Sylvia Lazos, Only Skin Deep?, 83 IND. L. J. 1423, 1442 (2008); Toobin, supra note 6. 
 37 Senate confirmation of appellate court nominees is critical, given Senate approval of two circuit 
judges in the last two years; three nominees have waited months on floor debates and votes.  See 
supra notes 23, 25. 
 38 These were the final years of two-term Presidents (except for Bush pére), who confronted many 
fewer vacancies, and all elected but him were opposition party members.  End of presidency leg-
islative matters also assumed precedence.  Kelsey Snell, Senate Considers Making a Short Pre-
Election Session Even Shorter, WASH. POST, (Sept. 9, 2016) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/09/09/senate-considering-making-a-
short-session-even-shorter/. 
 39 Carl Tobias, The Transformation of the Thurmond Rule in 2016, 66 EMORY L. J. 2001 (2016); 
see supra note 24. 
 40 Report Pending Judicial Nominations, ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE (Nov. 11, 2016) www.afj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/ReportPendingNominees.pdf. 
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restart the process41 and the judgeships could well remain vacant for more 
than a year, given numerous other higher priorities, such as creating a gov-
ernment as well as nominating and confirming a new Justice and sixteen 
circuit judges.42 
These ideas demonstrate that Republicans should actively cooperate 
with Democrats.  They ought to alternate final votes on candidates whom 
each party mustered while swiftly according them ballots.  If the GOP es-
chews collaboration by, for instance, aggressively “cherry picking” nomi-
nees whom Republicans actually submitted, Democrats might protest unan-
imous consent or assertively recruit GOP centrists to filibuster nominees.43 
Activities effectively must begin immediately to facilitate endeavors 
when Congress does assemble.  Obama should vigorously pursue creative 
ideas from resources knowledgeable about strong consensus prospects and 
keep assiduously cultivating home state politicians, asking that lawmakers 
support people he suggested.44  Until, and even after, Congress arrives, 
both parties’ Judiciary Committee staff may amply review the twenty nom-
inees awaiting hearings.  The panel concomitantly ought to set as many 
hearings and meetings as possible during the week politicians convene and 
conduct the maximum number practicable until adjournment. 
When the session commences, legislators must probe nominees’ capa-
bility, ethics, and temperament with expeditious committee hearings and 
ballots speedily followed by complete, robust floor debates and votes.  
More particularly, lawmakers ought to seriously consider reinstituting nu-
merous longstanding traditions.  Most pertinent would be scrutinizing 
numbers of prominent, moderate, trial level aspirants throughout the lame 
duck session, a nuanced custom which modern Presidents and Senates con-
ventionally respected.45 
 
 41 For example, President Donald Trump must consult home state politicians, some of whom must 
create merit selection commissions or recalibrate existing ones to recommend candidates whom 
the politicians suggest to the White House, which must evaluate prospects and nominate.  The 
Senate must investigate nominees, conduct panel hearings, discussions and votes, and convene 
floor debates and votes. 
 42 The process is considerably more extensive and time consuming for appellate nominees and even 
more so for Supreme Court nominees, whose confirmation processes can essentially suspend 
lower court efforts for months. 
 43 Examples are Susan Collins (Me.) and Mark Kirk (Ill.).  A cherry picking example was Republi-
cans’ offer to vote on three nominees whom they favored and one whom Democrats picked by 
skipping two African Americans whom Democrats favored.  This provoked Democratic objec-
tions to unanimous consent.  162 CONG. REC. S5900 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 2016). 
 44 Obama also may ask home state politicians to swiftly proffer for the 37 district openings without 
nominees excellent consensus picks whom he analyzes expeditiously and nominates when Con-
gress arrives, but they will lack time for 2016 approval, yet could have hearings then and 2017 
approval, if re-nominated.  JUDICIAL EMERGENCIES, supra note 1 available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies. 
 45 Judith Schaeffer, What’s Good for One Lame Duck Ought to be Good for Another, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Nov. 11, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/judith-e-schaeffer/whats-good-for-one-
 
Nov. 2016] CONFIRMING JUDGES 9 
This year, the President and legislators should especially honor that cus-
tom.  The district courts desperately need the open slots filled, and the vast 
majority of those possibilities received nomination because they are com-
petent, uncontroversial, and diverse, rather than ideological.46 
Another custom to which Senators must adhere would be permitting fi-
nal ballots on quite a few of these excellent choices before recesses, namely 
during Thanksgiving.47  The politicians also should restore the convention 
of proffering abundant deference to home state colleagues and the Presi-
dent, who has meticulously consulted, indulged Senators’ preferences, and 
tapped numerous selections whom Republicans designated.48 
The GOP must correspondingly revisit the determination to refuse 
many nominees’ floor votes, which has delayed even the most accom-
plished, noncontroversial, diverse candidates.  If Republicans aggressively 
continue enforcing this approach, Democrats might again implement rather 
dramatic reforms, which occurred earlier when they cautiously jettisoned 
anonymous chamber holds placed on nominees and the sixty-vote cloture 
proviso.49  Democrats may even allow final ballots on a number of compe-
tent trial judge submissions proposed by GOP lawmakers in exchange for 
Republican agreements to have chamber votes on many whom Democrats 
favor.50 
In the end, Republicans and Democrats should precisely balance the 
competing needs to thoroughly review suggestions and quickly fill myriad 
vacancies.  Particularly with numerous fine, mainstream individuals availa-
 
lame-d_b_782130.html.  See Tobias, supra note 39, at 2002 (noting that Strom Thurmond, the 
architect of the Thurmond rule, helped facilitate Stephen Breyer’s appellate confirmation); id. at 
2005 n.19 (discussing recent situations that seem to demonstrate that lame duck sessions are 
more prevalent in mid-term, than presidential, election years). 
 46 Robert Carp et al., A First Term Assessment: The Ideology of Barack Obama’s District Court 
Appointees, 97 JUDICATURE 128, 136 (2013); Tobias, supra note 2, at 2249.  The Judicial Con-
ference recommendation for Congress that it authorize 73 new judgeships was premised on con-
servative case and workload estimates in empirical data, which show the critical need.  U.S. Jud. 
Conf., Proceedings 18 (Mar. 10, 2015).  See Federal Judgeship Act of 2013, S. 1385, 113th 
Cong. (2013) (proposing the creation of additional judgeships for the circuit and district courts). 
 47 Excellent, consensus Bush district nominees had expeditious approval, especially at recesses.  
Goldman et al., supra note 2, at 281; Michael L. Shenkman, Decoupling District from Circuit 
Judge Nominations: A Proposal to Put Trial Bench Confirmations on Track, 65 ARK. L. REV. 
217, 292 (2012). 
 48 Goldman et al., supra note 2, at 16-17; Carl Tobias, Justifying Diversity in the Federal Judiciary, 
106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 283, 296 (2012). 
 49 S. Res. 28, 157th Cong., 157 CONG. REC. S296 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2011) (adopted) (secret holds); 
Everett, supra note 18 (nuclear option). Democrats may even decide to reinstitute the latter rule. 
Burgess Everett, Confirmation Battles Are Back, POLITICO, (Sept. 28, 2014), 6:06 PM, updated 
7:07 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/09/senate-confirmation-battles-111402. 
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ble to fill the many vacancies, this balance should favor expeditious con-
sideration and approval.  The Constitution envisions that Senators will 
probe nominee ability, character, and temperament.51  Legislators should, 
as the chief executive deftly has, deemphasize ideology, which possesses 
minimal relevance for those criteria,52 and cabin speculation about how ju-
rists would resolve legal issues, because that can erode judicial independ-
ence.53  The GOP also ought to cease delaying nominees essentially for po-
litical gain alone, as this could harm them, litigants, jurists, and selection 
procedures’ integrity.  One salutary remedy for the difficulties would be a 
presumption that capable, moderate nominees merit rapid final ballots.54 
CONCLUSION 
Obama and Senators cooperating with the President enjoyed success 
when they appointed talented, centrist, diverse judges.  If Republicans and 
Democrats recalibrate the process by cooperating again over the lame duck 
session, they can confirm numbers of these jurists, felicitously enabling the 
bench to more promptly, inexpensively, and fairly treat cases. 
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